Firm Dynamics with Infrequent Adjustment and Learning by Pinto, Eugenio
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Firm Dynamics with Infrequent Adjustment and Learning
Eugenio Pinto
2008-14
NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary
materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth
are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the
Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than
acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.
Firm Dynamics with Infrequent Adjustment and Learning
Eugénio Pinto
February 2008
Abstract
We propose an explanation for the rapid post-entry growth of surviving rms found in
recent studies. At the core of our theory is the interaction between adjustment costs
and learning by entering rms about their e¢ ciency. We show that linear adjustment
costs, i.e., proportional costs, create incentives for rms to enter smaller and for successful
rms to grow faster after entry. Initial uncertainty about protability makes entering
rms prudent since they want to avoid incurring superuous costs on jobs that prove to
be excessive ex post. Because higher adjustment costs imply less pruning of ine¢ cient
rms and faster growth of surviving rms, the contribution of survivors to growth in a
cohorts average size increases. For the cohort of 1988 entrants in the Portuguese economy,
we conclude that survivors growth is the main factor behind growth in the cohorts
average size. However, initial selection is higher and the survivorscontribution to growth
is smaller in services than in manufacturing. An estimation of the model shows that
the proportional adjustment cost is the key parameter to account for the high empirical
survivorscontribution. In addition, rms in manufacturing learn relatively less initially
about their e¢ ciency and are subject to larger adjustment costs than rms in services.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been renewed interest in explaining patterns of rm dynamics, with
new longitudinal datasets conrming heterogeneities between rms of di¤erent size and age.
In particular, small and young (surviving) rms tend to grow faster and have higher failure
rates than large and old rms, so that job destruction due to plant exit and job creation due
to the scaling-up of rm size decrease with age.1 Moreover, entering plants tend to be small,
but survivors grow rapidly after entry and are the main factor behind the shift to the right of
a cohorts size distribution.2 These patterns di¤er signicantly across countries and sectors,
suggesting that technological di¤erences are important, but that country specic factors also
matter.3
This paper proposes an explanation for the leading role of survivors growth in post-
entry rm dynamics based on the interaction between adjustment costs and a learning-about-
e¢ ciency mechanism. Following a literature that uses adjustment costs to account for some
dynamic properties of rmslabor demand, such as Je¤rey Campbell and Jonas Fisher (2000),
we show that adjustment costs can impact the lifetime dynamics of rmslabor demand in
a way consistent with the data. To implement our theory, we use a standard model of rm
dynamics with passive learning. In order to check the empirical t of our model, we also
assume that ine¢ cient rms are pruned from the market, although the predictions of our
theory hold even in the absence of a selection mechanism (e.g. when exit is not allowed).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we contribute to the empirical literature by introducing
a decomposition of the change in a cohorts average size into a survivor component and a non-
survivor component. Given the emphasis on survivorsgrowth, our measure allows a quick
assessment of how well a particular theory matches the data in that respect. We apply our
decomposition to the 1988 cohort of entrants in the Portuguese economy, using the Quadros
de Pessoal dataset. Similarly to Cabral and Mata (2003), we nd that growth of survivors
is the main force behind the change in the cohorts average rm size. However, we also nd
that growth of survivors is especially intense in the initial years after entry and that there are
signicant cross-sector di¤erences in terms of our decomposition. In particular, initial exit
rates are smaller and the survivorscontribution to changes in size is higher in manufacturing
than in services.
Second, we contribute to the theoretical literature by introducing linear adjustment costs
into a model of Bayesian learning about e¢ ciency. Our assumption of linear or proportional
costs is justied by the nding of high inaction rates in employment adjustment, in varying
degrees across sectors. Our model builds on Boyan Jovanovic (1982) by adding proportional
costs that apply not only to regular labor adjustment, but also to job creation at entry and
1See Timothy Dunne, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson (1989a, 1989b).
2See José Mata and Pedro Portugal (1994) and Luís Cabral and José Mata (2003).
3See Eric Bartelsman, Stefano Scarpetta, and Fabiano Schivardi (2005).
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job destruction at exit. We show that proportional adjustment costs create incentives for
rms to start smaller and, if successful, grow faster after entry. We prove this analytically
in a simplied model in which there is no exit of rms. This result shows that proportional
costs can generate rm growth without selection. When rms are allowed to exit, selection
intensies the e¤ects of adjustment costs on rm growth, while costs to adjustment reduce
exit rates. Therefore, adjustment costs increase the contribution of surviving rms to growth
in the cohorts average size.
All that is needed for rm growth under linear adjustment costs is the existence of a
learning environment that generates a stochastic process for perceived e¢ ciency with both
persistence and decreasing uncertainty in age.4 The intuition for why rms grow faster and
display smaller exit rates under proportional adjustment costs is that initial uncertainty about
true protability makes entering rms prudent; that is, they enter small and wait and see
since they want to avoid incurring superuous entering/hiring costs and ring/shutdown costs
on jobs that prove to be excessive ex post. This implies that surviving rms will grow faster,
even though adjustment costs imply that there are fewer rms exiting the market and therefore
less pruning of ine¢ cient rms.
The assumption that entering rms face a Bayesian learning problem concerning their ef-
ciency is standard in selection theories and has been advanced as an explanation for the high
rates of exit, job creation, and job destruction among young rms. The initial literature on ad-
justment costs used a (strictly) convex specication in an attempt to explain the sluggishness
in input responses to aggregate shocks. However, the assumption that costs of adjustment are
linear is now standard in dynamic labor demand models, following a number of studies since
the late 1980s that have documented the importance of inaction in employment adjustment
at the micro level.5 Since strictly convex costs imply smooth adjustments over time, whereas
linear costs imply immediate adjustment when it occurs, allowing for strictly convex costs,
instead of linear costs, in the context where they also apply at entry and exit, would bias
our analysis and eventually make our argument stronger. In the case of hiring/entering costs,
entering rms would prefer to start smaller and adjust gradually to their optimal size, even
if their perceived productivity remained unchanged or learning was absent. For ring/exiting
costs, rms experiencing large declines in perceived productivity would adjust downwards in
several steps, a scenario that would make rms start smaller to attenuate its e¤ects. There-
fore, by avoiding a bias towards rm growth, our decision to assume linear costs is conservative
and permits a simplication of the methods employed to measure the e¤ects of adjustment
costs.6
To assess our model quantitatively, we calibrate and estimate a version of the model with
4For example, rm growth would occur in our model even if exit was random with a constant probability
for all rms, whereas that would not be true in a pure selection model.
5See Daniel Hamermesh and Gerard Pfann (1996).
6Although we could have included xed adjustment costs they seem more relevant in the case of capital.
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nite learning horizon and positive dispersion in entry size. We conclude that linear costs
are the key element to account for the high empirical contribution of survivors to changes in
a cohorts average size. A calibration/estimation for the manufacturing and services cohorts
also suggests that rms in manufacturing learn relatively less initially about their e¢ ciency
and are subject to substantially larger adjustment costs than rms in services.
This paper is related to the literature on both adjustment costs and rm dynamics. Within
the literature on adjustment costs, the paper is associated with theories that use linear adjust-
ment costs to explain certain aspects of the dynamic behavior of labor demand and job ows.
Well-known examples are Samuel Bentolila and Giuseppe Bertola (1990), Hugo Hopenhayn
and Richard Rogerson (1993), and Campbell and Fisher (2000). Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) analyze the e¤ects of proportional ring (and hiring)
costs on the dynamics of hiring and ring decisions, and on average labor demand. Both pa-
pers conclude that high ring costs make hiring and ring adjustments more sluggish, but they
disagree on the implications of that for long-run employment. Campbell and Fisher (2000)
use proportional costs of job creation and job destruction to explain the higher aggregate
volatility of job destruction found in the U.S. manufacturing sector. These costs imply that
in reaction to aggregate wage shocks employment changes at contracting rms are larger than
employment changes at expanding rms. What is new in our paper is the assumption that
adjustment costs apply equally to the entry/exit decisions and the hiring/ring decisions.7
Within the literature on rm dynamics the paper is connected with theories that attempt
to explain the stylized facts on the lifecycle dynamics outlined above. The two main explana-
tions for these facts are theories based on selection of rms and theories based on nancing
constraints.8 Selection theories stress the tendency for rms that accumulate bad realizations
of productivity to exit the market and for rms that accumulate good realizations to sur-
vive and expand. This implies a composition bias towards larger and more e¢ cient rms as
smaller, ine¢ cient, and slow-growing rms gradually exit the industry. Representative papers
of selection theories are Jovanovic (1982), Hugo Hopenhayn (1992), Richard Ericson and Ariel
Pakes (1995), and Erzo Luttmer (2007). In all cases productivity realizations are exogenous,
except in Ericson and Pakes (1995) where they are to some extent endogenous.
Meanwhile, theories employing nancing constraints argue that some imperfection in -
nancial markets causes young rms to have limited access to credit, forcing them to enter at a
suboptimally small scale. As rms get older and survive, they establish creditworthiness and
build up internal resources that enable them to expand to their optimal size. Important con-
tributions to this literature are those of Thomas Cooley and Vincenzo Quadrini (2001), Rui
7Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) did consider that the ring cost applied also at exit, but in their model
there is no learning process and they did not analyze the e¤ect of the ring cost on rm growth.
8Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and Mark Wright (2007) advance an alternative theory based on mean reversion
in the accumulation of industry-specic human capital. However, their model only deals with size-dependence
of rm dynamics, and has nothing to say about age-dependence of rm dynamics, which is our main concern.
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Albuquerque and Hugo Hopenhayn (2004), and Gian Luca Clementi and Hugo Hopenhayn
(2006). In Cooley and Quadrini (2001) a transaction cost on equity and a default cost on
debt imply that equity and debt are not perfect substitutes, so that size depends positively
on the amount of equity. In Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2006) lenders introduce credit constraints because of limited liability of borrowers and
limited enforcement of debt contracts and because of asymmetric information on the use of
funds or the return on investment, respectively.
Cabral and Mata (2003) analyze whether these two theories are consistent with the evo-
lution of a cohorts size distribution in the Portuguese manufacturing sector. They nd that,
as the cohort ages, the rm size distribution shifts to the right largely due to growth of sur-
viving rms rather than exit of small rms. In addition, they nd that in the rst year after
entry younger business owners are associated with smaller rms but that is no longer the
case once the cohort gets to age seven. Assuming that age is a proxy for the entrepreneurs
initial wealth, the authors conclude that the age-size e¤ect supports the idea of nancially
constrained rms starting at a suboptimal size and present a model with nancing constraints
capturing this e¤ect.
More recently, Paolo Angelini and Andrea Generale (forthcoming) use survey and balance
sheet information for Italian manufacturing rms to analyze the impact of nancing con-
straints on the evolution of the rm size distribution. They nd that nancially constrained
rms tend to be small and young, although this does not have a signicant e¤ect on the
overall rm size distribution. Moreover, they nd that nancing constraints decrease rm
growth, with this e¤ect being entirely due to small rms. In particular, being young and -
nancially constrained does not have any additional e¤ect. Based on these results and the fact
that young rms grow faster than old rms, the authors conclude that nancing constraints
are not the main factor behind the evolution of the rm size distribution. In line with their
argument, this paper interprets the facts presented in Cabral and Mata (2003) and other
cross-sector evidence as the result of the interaction between adjustment costs and learning
about e¢ ciency.9
To our knowledge, this work is the rst to suggest adjustment costs as an explanation for
di¤erences in rm dynamics by age. The paper by Luís Cabral (1995) is nearest to this paper.
In his model, rms must pay a proportional sunk cost to increase their production capacity.
He argues that, in a model with Bayesian learning, a proportional capacity cost would make
small entering rms grow faster than large entering rms. The reason is that small entrants
are those whose initial protability signals were not good, so their exit probabilities are higher,
and therefore they choose to invest more gradually. Unlike our model, Cabrals model depends
on the existence of selection. Also, by analyzing a size-growth relationship, his model is not
9Our interpretation of the age-size e¤ect is close to the alternative explanation proposed by Cabral and
Mata (2003, footnote 14), in the sense that young business owners would be subject to a more intense learning.
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able to explain why some large entering rms also grow substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present evidence of rm dynamics for a
cohort of entering rms. In section 3, we build the general model, obtain optimality conditions,
and provide heuristic arguments explaining the e¤ects of adjustment costs. In section 4, using
a simplied version of the model we analytically prove the e¤ect of linear adjustment costs
on survivorsgrowth. In section 5, we calibrate and estimate a nite learning horizon version
of the model and quantify the contribution of adjustment costs to rm dynamics. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are left for an appendix.
2 Firm Dynamics in a Cohort of Entering Firms
There is a well established literature on the identication and explanation of di¤erences in
behavior between young and old rms. In this section, we analyze rm dynamics in a cohort
of entering rms. We use Quadros de Pessoal, a database containing information on all Por-
tuguese rms with paid employees. This dataset originates from a mandatory annual survey
run by the Ministry of Employment, which collects information about the rm, its establish-
ments, and its workers. All economic sectors except public administration are included. The
panel we have access to covers the period 1985-2000. Information refers to March of each year
from 1985 through 1993, and to October of each year since the reformulation of the survey in
1994. On average the dataset contains 250,000 rms, 300,000 establishments, and 2,500,000
workers in each year.
The literature on rm dynamics typically nds that young rms grow faster than old
rms. Using kernel density estimates of the rm size distribution in a cohort of entrants,
Cabral and Mata (2003) argue graphically that the cohorts evolution is mostly due to growth
of survivors rather than exit of small rms. Their analysis points to the need for a measure of
the contribution of survivors versus non-survivors to the growth in a given cohorts average
size. To accomplish this, we propose a decomposition of the cohorts cumulative growth that
will later allow an assessment of the empirical relevance of adjustment costs. We consider the
following decomposition:
1
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where  is the rms age, li; = ln (Li; ) is log-employment at rm i in period  , S is the
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set of age- surviving rms, D is the set of age- non-surviving rms, so that fS ; Dg is a
partition of S0, and N (X) is the number of rms in set X.10
In general, the growth in a cohorts average size can originate from growth of survivors
or from smaller initial size of non-survivors. Any theory of rm dynamics should consider
both these sources of growth. Our measure allows a check on whether a particular theory can
explain the key source of growth in a cohorts average size. The survivor component compares
the current average size of period  survivors with their initial average size, so that it measures
how much survivors have grown. The non-survivor component compares the average initial
size of period  non-survivors with the average initial size of period  survivors, so that it
measures how relatively small non-survivors were initially.
We can obtain a similar decomposition for employment-weighted moments. The weighted
decomposition contains information about the entire distribution of employment, not just its
cross-sectional mean, and is a¤ected both by within- and between-rm growth. Therefore, the
weighted decomposition would be more relevant for assessing a richer model that considers
the reallocation of employment shares between rms within the cohort. In the results that
follow we focus on the unweighted decomposition because it analyzes within-rm growth,
which in our model is the most relevant statistic to assess the e¤ect of adjustment costs on
the incentives for rms to grow.11
We can also produce a decomposition based on the cohorts annual growth instead of the
cohorts cumulative growth. However, the annual version of the above decomposition is more
sensitive to two aspects that would complicate the analysis in the paper. First, the annual
survivor component is signicantly a¤ected by the business cycle, especially after the rst
few years of life. To control for this, we would need to somehow remove the cyclical part
of the survivor component. Second, as the age of the cohort increases, the annual survivor
component becomes increasingly sensitive to downsizing and exit by some survivors that
become technologically outdated and consequently relatively less e¢ cient. To fully consider
this aspect of the data would force us to introduce additional parameters into the model that
we present in section 3. Therefore, we believe that by employing a decomposition based on
the cohorts cumulative growth we avoid having to adjust the analysis for these two aspects,
10Throughout the paper we will assume that rms enter in some generic period 0. Therefore,  will represent
both the rms age and the period (after entry) we are analyzing.
11For the weighted decomposition, the cumulative change would be
P
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i; li: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P
i2S0 !
S0
i;0li;0, where
!Xi; is the weight of rm i in period  in set X, with !
X
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 = Li;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P
i2X Li; . The weighted survivor component
can be further decomposed asX
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The rst term is a within-rm component, measuring average growth weighted by initial size; the second
term is a between-rm component, measuring the contribution of changes in employment shares; and the
third is a cross component. For the unweighted decomposition, the last two terms are zero, since in this case
!Xi; = N (X)
 1.
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Table 1: 1988 Firm Cohort: All Economy
Year CumEx AvEmp CGrEmp SurComp
1988 1.11
1989 15.6 1.27 15.2 69.5
1990 24.4 1.36 24.8 70.4
1991 30.8 1.43 31.2 69.7
1992 35.4 1.46 34.2 69.3
1993 40.0 1.46 34.6 68.9
1994 43.4 1.47 35.3 69.1
1995 46.7 1.48 36.1 68.7
1996 49.9 1.49 37.4 67.2
1997 52.7 1.51 39.6 68.5
1998 55.5 1.52 40.7 68.3
1999 58.5 1.54 43.0 68.9
Notes: CumEx is the cumulative exit rate, 100N(D )=N(S0); AvEmp
is the mean of log-employment among survivors, N(S ) 1
P
i2S l ;
CGrEmp is the cumulative log-growth rate (in %) of employ-
ment among survivors, 100  [N(S ) 1Pi2S l   N(S0) 1Pi2S0 l0];
SurComp is the survivor component (in %), 100 [N(S ) 1Pi2S l  
N(S )
 1P
i2S l0)]=[N(S )
 1P
i2S l  N(S0) 1
P
i2S0 l0].
and instead focus on how intense is survivors growth while learning-about-e¢ ciency e¤ects
are signicant.
In table 1, we present the evolution of exit rates and the share of rm growth due to the
survivor component in the 1988 cohort of entering rms for the overall economy.12 In 1988
there were 22; 810 entering rms. The exit rate is very high initially but tends to decrease
as rms get older.13 However, ten years after entry only 41:5% of the initial entrants remain
active. There is signicant growth in the cohorts average size, especially in the rst few years,
which is mostly due to the growth of survivors rather than to the exit of small ine¢ cient rms:
survivorsgrowth contributes around 69% to the growth in the cohorts average size.14
12We identify entering rms in year t as those rms that have not been in the database before t. Given the
high incidence of temporarily missing rms, we select the 1988 entering cohort, using 1985 and 1986 to detect
false entries. Similarly, we identify exiting rms in the  -th period (after entry in 1988) as those rms that are
present in the database in period    1, but do not reappear in any of the following periods. Therefore, we
display results only up to 1999, using 2000 to detect false exits. This procedure eliminates most false entries
and false exits.
13We adopt the following procedures concerning temporarily missing rms. In calculating the exit rate we
do not exclude temporarily missing rms, considering them as survivors. In calculating the cohorts mean
log-employment at period  , we scale it with a factor that compares that mean in period 0 between all rms
and those not temporarily missing in period  . We also adjust the data in 1994, when the survey moved from
March to October, to correct for a higher than normal exit rate and average growth in this year.
14When we use employment-weighted data, we nd that larger rms have smaller exit rates and, as a
consequence, average employment increases more intensely than in the unweighted data. This and the fact
that high-growth rms increase their weight over time, explains a larger survivor component in the employment-
weighted decomposition. A similar exercise for labor productivity reveals that survivors account for about 90%
of the change in the cohorts unweighted average productivity.
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Table 2: 1988 Firm Cohort: Summary Characteristics by Sector
Sector
EmpSh CumEx AvEmp CGrEmp SurComp
88 89 92 99 88 89 92 99 89-99
All 100.0 15.6 35.4 58.5 1.11 15.2 34.2 43.0 69.0
Manu 41.8 14.6 35.9 58.9 1.58 17.4 38.7 45.5 82.8
Serv 20.1 17.1 36.6 58.0 0.99 11.7 30.8 40.2 61.7
Notes: EmpSh is the employment share of the sector in the overall economy cohort; CumEx,
CGrEmp, SurComp are as dened in table 1.
Table 2 presents similar evidence on cohort dynamics for the manufacturing and services
sectors.15 We include the employment shares of each sector in the 1988 cohort of entering
rms, which are close to shares in the overall economy. Although manufacturing has a much
higher employment share than services, the number of entering rms in services surpasses that
of manufacturing (6074 and 4834, respectively). Both sectors display a cumulative exit rate
around 58% by 1999. However, initial di¤erences in exit rates are more signicant, with man-
ufacturing displaying the smallest values, and services displaying the highest values. In terms
of initial size, manufacturing has the largest entrants, and services the smallest. Although
manufacturing has the largest entrants, it exhibits more growth in average employment and
a larger contribution of survivors to that growth than services.
We perform two robustness checks on the previous ndings. First, we redo our calculations
using establishments rather than rms as the unit of analysis. For the 1988 establishment
cohort, we obtain similar results, although exit rates and the survivor component are higher
than in the case of rms. Second, we examine an alternative cohort to make sure our results are
not driven by business cycle conditions. The Portuguese economy experienced an expansion
between 1986 and 1991, a period of slow growth with a recession between 1992 and 1994, and
another weaker expansion between 1995 and 2000. The growth rates of real GDP were 6:4%
in 1989, 1:1% in 1992, and 4:3% in 1995, so that the 1991 cohort did not face as favorable
a macroeconomic environment as the 1988 cohort. However, the results for the 1991 cohort
are, in all dimensions, very similar to those presented above. The results for the 1994 cohort
are also very similar, but with slightly smaller values for the survivor component in the rst
few years after entry.16
In table 3, we provide evidence on characteristics of labor adjustment in the 1988 cohort
15 In order to obtain equivalent one-digit SIC87 sectors, we use the following correspondence in terms of
CAE Rev. 1 codes : manufacturing(= 3) and services(= 6:3 + 8:3:2 + 8:3:3 + 9:2 + 9:3 + 9:4 + 9:5).
16Reecting our previous argument about the greater cyclical sensitivity of the decomposition based on the
cohorts annual growth rate, we observe a substantial reduction in the annual survivor component associated
with the 1988 and 1991 cohorts during the 1992-1994 slow growth period. However, a similar pattern does not
occur with the 1994 cohort. This is one of the reasons why we choose a decomposition based on cumulative
growth rates. Note also that the annual non-survivor component is not as sensitive to the business cycle as
the annual survivor component.
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Table 3: 1988 Firm Cohort: Characteristics of Labor Adjustment by Sector
Sector
89 93
N30 NA P30 N30 NA P30
All 7.9 43.0 13.7 13.7 45.3 17.1
Manu 10.8 31.5 20.7 20.9 33.4 24.6
Serv 7.3 47.7 11.8 11.3 50.3 15.0
Notes: N30 is the fraction of rms with an adjusted growth
rate of employment, conditional on survival, in the interval
( 30%; 0%); NA is the fraction of rms that do not adjust
employment, conditional on survival; P30 is the fraction of
rms with an adjusted growth rate of employment, condi-
tional on survival, in the interval (0%; 30%).
of entering rms. We use the distribution of the adjusted growth rate conditional on survival.
Following Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger (1992), the adjusted growth rate in period 
is dened as 100  (L   L 1) =~L 1, where ~L 1 = 12 (L + L 1). The table shows that
the incidence of inaction is very high, increases with age, and is higher in services than in
manufacturing. This may reect technology-induced di¤erences in adjustment costs, or job
indivisibilities a¤ecting to a larger extent the services sector for having a higher share of small
rms. The table also shows that the large majority of rms have adjustment rates within
the ( 30%; 30%) interval. A high rate of inaction and small adjustment is usually considered
consistent with the presence of linear or proportional adjustment costs. An additional fact
is the left skewness of the 1989 distributions, showing that survivors tend to grow initially,
especially in manufacturing. This skewness is less evident in 1993, suggesting that adjustment
patterns are di¤erent in initial years. The evidence on inaction justies our assumption of
linear adjustment costs in the model that we present next.
3 A Model of Learning with Linear Adjustment Costs
3.1 Assumptions and Solution
In this section, we introduce linear adjustment costs into a model of Bayesian learning about
e¢ ciency. We derive conditions for optimal employment over time and present heuristic
arguments about the e¤ects of adjustment costs on the path of employment. Our model is
based on Jovanovic (1982), adding adjustment costs and using a di¤erent specication for the
idiosyncratic shock.
We assume an industry with competitive output and input markets. Current prots of a
representative rm are dened by
(L; ) = F (L)    wL,
9
where F (L)  is the production function; L is the amount of labor input;  is a productivity
shock; and w is the wage rate. The output price is normalized to unity, so that all monetary
values are expressed in units of the output price. Given the competitive environment, the
rm treats w as a constant.
Concerning technology we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The two components of the production function satisfy:
(a) F : R+ ! R+ is C2, F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0, F (0) = 0, F 0 (0+) =1, and F 0 (1) = 0.
(b) Letting  denote the rms age and 0 the period in which the rm enters, the stochastic
process of  is dened by
 =  ( ) ,  = + " ,  = 0 + 1,  = 0; 1; : : : (1a)
"  N
 
0; 2

, 0  N

; 20

, 1  N

0; 21

, (1b)
where 0, 1, f"g0 are mutually independent,  : R ! R++ is C1, 0 > 0 and  ( 1) =
1  0,  (1) = 2 <1.
Part (a) basically ensures a well dened interior optimum. In some of the analyses be-
low, we will further specialize by assuming that F is Cobb-Douglas. Meanwhile, part (b)
establishes that in each period productivity is stochastic with a constant mean over the rms
lifetime. The productivity component, , is made of two parts: 0, which is observed before
entry, and 1, which is never directly observed by the rm. Intuitively, 0 can be thought of
as indexing ex ante e¢ ciency, measuring initial technology choice, while 1 indexes ex post
productivity, measuring how well a rm performs within its technology choice.
The introduction of 0 is essential to obtain a non-degenerate distribution of rmsentry
size, allowing an analysis of the contribution of survivors to growth in the cohorts average size.
In contrast, the absence of 0 in Jovanovics (1982) model generates a degenerate distribution
of rmsentry size. Under this scenario, for any period after entry, survivors and non-survivors
have the same average initial size implying a value of 100% to our measure of the survivors
component. By assuming 0 > 0, we avoid this aspect of Jovanovics model.
Before entry the rm knows the parameters governing the stochastic process of , i.e., ,
20 , 
2
1
and 2, and learns its ex ante productivity, 0, after paying a research cost, I. After
entry, the rm will learn about its specic ex post productivity, 1, over time as it observes the
realizations of productivity, . In particular, the rm forecasts period- productivity based
on the ex ante e¢ ciency parameter 0 and on the past realizations of productivity, fsg 1s=0 .
Similarly to Arnold Zellner (1971), a rm with age  has the following Bayesian posterior
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distribution for  at the beginning of period  :
j
  N (Y ; Z ) , 
 
n
0; fsg 1s=0
o
(2a)
Y =
 2
Z 1
 +
 21
Z 1
0,  =
1

 1X
s=0
s, Z =
1
 2 +  21
: (2b)
In lemma 2 of appendix A we show that, for purposes of predicting , the information set 

can be summarized by ( ; ), where 

 is the period- forecast of the productivity coe¢ cient
based on the information available at the beginning of period  . That is,  = E ( ), where
E ()  E ( j 
 ) is the expectation conditional on the period- information set.
We now lay out the timing assumptions.
Assumption 3 A potential entering rm, at the beginning of period 0, takes the following
actions:
(i.a) Research cost and ex ante productivity: the rm pays a xed cost I, associated with the
process of initial research, after which it observes a realization of ex ante productivity, 0.
(i.b) Entry decision and entry cost: based on the idiosyncratic realization of 0, the rm
chooses whether to enter the industry or not. In case of entry, the rm pays W for acquiring
the (exogenously determined) capital stock.
(i.c) Initial employment and production decisions: conditional on entering the industry, the
rm chooses how much labor to use and how much output to produce in period 0.
A rm of age  > 0 takes the following actions:
(ii.a) Update of posterior productivity: at the beginning of period  , the rm updates its
posterior expectation of  ,  , based on the observation of  1 = 
 
 1

at the end of
period    1.
(ii.b) Exit decision: given the new posterior productivity estimate,  , and employment from
last period, L 1, the rm chooses whether to stay or exit the industry. In case of exit, the
rm sells the capital stock for the value initially paid, W (no depreciation).
(ii.c) Employment and production decisions: conditional on staying, the rm chooses how
much labor to use and how much output to produce in the current period. At the end of period
 , the rm observes the productivity realization,  , and the process repeats itself again until
the rm decides to leave the industry.17
In the absence of adjustment costs, while deciding whether to stay one more period or to
exit, the rm compares the expected prot in case it stays, V , with the opportunity cost of
doing so, W , the value it would recover by selling the (exogenous) capital initially acquired,
17 In this model we do not consider the possibility that as rms get older they might decay or become obsolete.
This could be achieved by assuming exogenous probabilities for those two events. This could generate both a
decrease in size of old rms (decay) and the exit of old rms (decay and obsolescence).
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i.e.,
V ( ; ) = max
L

(L ; 

 ) + E

max

W;V
 
+1;  + 1
		
(3)
where V represents expected prots conditional on staying in period  .
At entry, we have 
0  0, and in equilibrium expected prots must compensate for the
cost of acquiring capital, i.e., V EN (0) > W . Since markets are competitive and there is no
friction in the entry and exit processes, in equilibrium the research cost equals expected gains
at the research phase, i.e., E(V EN (0)) = I. If E
 
V EN

> I more rms will initiate research
and later enter the industry, causing a decrease in output price until equality is restored. A
strictly positive xed research cost, I > 0, is essential to avoid the extreme situation where
trial research is so high that only the highest productivity rms enter and survive. Because
there is no reliable capital stock variable in Quadros de Pessoal, we do not make the capital
decision endogenous to the model. Instead, we assume that rms are homogeneous along the
capital dimension and face the same opportunity cost of remaining in activity, W .
Up to this point, the only di¤erences between our model and Jovanovic (1982) are that in
the latter model the e¢ ciency parameter implicitly a¤ects the cost function and the cohorts
entry size distribution is degenerate. Therefore, without adjustment costs there would be no
intertemporal linkages in our model aside from the exit decision. As in Jovanovic, because
V is strictly increasing in , the exit decision is characterized by an age-dependent exit
threshold. For values of  above or equal to that threshold, the rm would stay and choose
employment to maximize current period prots. For values of  below that threshold, the
rm would leave the industry, since its expected protability is below the opportunity cost.
The increasing condence the rm puts in  as it grows older implies that the exit threshold
is increasing with age. This is the driving force underlying Jovanovics result that the size
distribution and the survival probability increase with age.
We now introduce linear adjustment costs into the model. The adjustment cost for con-
tinuing rms, CS , is dened as
CS (L ; L 1) = P jL   L 1j
where P is the cost per unit of adjustment. Since this is a model with endogenous entry and
exit of rms, we consider that this cost also applies to the entry and exit decisions, so that
the costs for entering and exiting rms, CEN and CEX respectively, are given by
CEN (L0) = P L0, CEX (L ) = P L .
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With adjustment costs, the problem now becomes,
V S (L 1;  ; ) = max
L

(L ; 

 )  CS (L ; L 1)

+
E

max

V EX (L ) ; V
S
 
L ; 

+1;  + 1
		
, (4)
for all periods after entry (  1) in which the rm remains in the industry, and
V EN (0) = max
L0

(L0; 

0)  CEN (L0)

+ E0

max

V EX (L0) ; V
S (L0; 

1; 1)
		
, (5)
for the entry period, where V EX , the value of exiting, is dened as
V EX (L ) =W   CEX (L ) .
Note that contrary to the case without adjustment costs, the previous period employment is
a state variable for the current period optimization problem. Also, in V EN and in V EX the
costs of hiring at entry and ring at exit are taken into account.
In general, we could allow for asymmetry among the cost parameters in CS , CEN , and
CEX . However, asymmetries between the cost of regular ring and the cost of ring at
exit or between the cost of regular hiring and the cost of hiring at entry lead to biases in
entry and exit decisions. For example, if the per unit regular hiring cost is higher than the
per unit entry hiring cost, then rms will hire more workers at entry in order to save on
expected future higher hiring costs. Similarly, if the per unit regular ring cost is smaller
than the per unit exit ring cost, then rms facing the prospect of exit will re workers before
exiting the industry, saving on expected future higher exit ring costs. To avoid these biases,
throughout the paper we assume symmetry between the parameters in CS , CEN , and CEX .
A more interesting distinction is between ring and hiring costs. We will see below that the
conclusion of the paper is immune to asymmetries between the costs of adding and subtracting
workers.
In solving the rms problem, we consider a two-step optimization procedure where the
rm rst chooses optimal employment in each of three possible scenarios, and then selects the
scenario with the highest pay-o¤. More precisely,
V S () = maxV SD () ; V SN () ; V SU ()	 ,
where V SD and V SU are obtained by maximizing the objective function in (4) over L  L 1
and L  L 1, respectively, and V SN is obtained by choosing L = L 1 in (4). Although
the adjustment cost function introduces a non-di¤erentiability of the objective function at the
frontiers between adjustment and non-adjustment, the usual properties of the value function
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V S and its associated optimal exit policy function hold
Proposition 4 Let V S be dened as in (4). Then:
(a) There exists a unique value function V S (L 1;  ; ) satisfying (4) that is bounded, con-
tinuous in (L 1;  ), and strictly increasing in 

 .
(b) There exists a unique optimal exit policy function  (L 1; 

 ) = 1
 
 < 
EX (L 1; )

,
where EX (L 1; ) is a unique continuous function in L 1.
Proof. See appendix A.18
In contrast, the non-di¤erentiability of the objective function generates an inaction region
in the employment policy, within which optimal employment does not vary with changes in
productivity.
Proposition 6 For any period  > 0, if the rm adjusts upwards, optimal employment sat-
ises

F 0 (L ) 

   w

+
1X
s=1
E
s

~+s ( P ) + ^+s

F 0
 
L+s

+s   w
	
= P , (6)
whereas if the rm adjusts downwards optimal employment satises

F 0 (L ) 

   w

+
1X
s=1
E
s

~+s ( P ) + ^+s

F 0
 
L+s

+s   w
	
=  P , (7)
In period 0, the rm enters the industry if V EN (0) W , in which case optimal employment
satises 
F 0 (L0) 

0   w

+
1X
s=1
E0
s

~s ( P ) + ^s

F 0 (Ls) 

s   w
	
= P . (8)
L+s is the optimal employment in period  + s, and ~+s, ^

+s are functions of the optimal
exit decision, +j, in periods  + 1 to  + s, such that ~

+s equals one when the rm has
remained in the industry until period  + s  1, but decides to exit in period  + s, and ^+s
equals one when the rm is still in the industry in period  + s.
Proof. See appendix A.
18Because in general V S is not concave, we cannot prove the usual di¤erentiability properties of the value
function. Therefore, in what follows, we implicitly assume that V S (L ; +1;  + 1) is di¤erentiable at L
with probability one, in terms of F (+1 j  ; ) for all  2 . By part (b) of proposition 4 and the
dominated convergence theorem, this implies that the objective functions associated with V SD, V SN and V SU
are continuously di¤erentiable in L, so that marginal conditions can be applied to nd interior optima. This
assumption also implies that V S (L 1;  ; ) is di¤erentiable at L 1 with probability one. In proposition 5
of appendix A, we prove that this property holds both in a model with a nite lifetime horizon and in a model
with innite-lived rms that face a nite learning horizon (as in sections 4 and 5).
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Equations (6), (7) and (8) are marginal conditions, similar to the smooth pasting condi-
tions in the (S, s) model literature, and they state that if the rm adjusts then the marginal
adjustment cost must equal the expected present discounted value of the marginal revenue
product for all future periods in which the rm is still in the industry, minus the increase in
the exit cost when the rm decides to exit. This is the discrete-time analog of the continuous-
time result present in Steven Nickell (1986) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990), adjusted for the
fact that now we also have an exit decision. Because the rm will not change employment if
the marginal cost of adjustment exceeds its marginal benet for the rst unit of adjustment,
proportional costs imply inaction in the employment decision of the rm.
Although the results in proposition 6 do not allow a formal proof of the e¤ects on rm
growth of adjustment costs in this general model, the following corollary of proposition 6
enables us to make qualitative heuristic statements about those e¤ects.
Corollary 7 For any period   0, the marginal benet of one additional unit of labor, that
is, the LHS of expressions (6), (7), and (8), can be recursively represented as
MB =
 
F 0 (L ) 

   w

+ E

+1 ( P ) +
 
1  +1

MB+1

(9)
where L = L (L 1; 

 ), 

 1 =  1 (L 1; 

 ) are the optimal employment and exit deci-
sions.
Proof. See appendix A.
3.2 Linear Adjustment Cost and Firm Growth
As we have seen above, in the absence of adjustment costs, optimal employment is determined
solely to maximize current period prots, so that F 0 (L)  = w. Therefore, rmsgrowth is
essentially a by-product of a selection mechanism: those rms that are ine¢ cient, and there-
fore small, exit, while those rms that are e¢ cient survive and grow. There is an additional
source of positive growth when the frictionless employment decision rule, L (), is convex in
. Because of Jensens inequality and because  is a Martingale, surviving rms will grow
over time: E

L
 
+1

> L

E
 
+1

= L ( ). However, L will not be convex in 

for general F (L).19
19 In general, from the optimal employment condition, F 0 (L)  = w, we have
L00 () =
 
F 000
 
L

F 0
 
L
  2F 00  L2
F 00
 
L
2

!
L0 () , F 00
 
L

< 0, L0 () > 0,
whose sign depends on F 000
 
L

. Therefore, if decreasing returns to labor do not decrease too fast, that is,
F 000
 
L

< 2F 00
 
L
2
=F 0
 
L

, then we will have L00 () < 0. When F (L) = ln (L), then L00 () = 0, and when
F (L) = L,  2 (0; 1), then L00 () > 0.
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Figure 1: Proportional Hiring/Entry Cost
In arguing heuristically about the impact of the proportional cost on rm growth we use the
property that MB is weakly increasing in  , and that L is locally weakly increasing in 

 .
Because it is not immediately obvious why ring and hiring costs should give similar incentives
for rm growth, we analyze separately these two costs.20 We present in gure 1 the case where
there is a hiring cost, PH > 0, and no ring cost, PF = 0. This gure assumes a given L 1.
For that specic value of Lt 1, SU and SD are the frontiers between non-adjustment and
upward and downward adjustment, respectively. Therefore, if  2

SD; SU

there will be
no adjustment and the marginal benet of an additional unit of labor (represented by the
dashed line) is contained in the interval

0; PH

. To simplify the argument, we consider a
rm whose sequence of productivity draws is such that in every period it has a perceived
productivity equal to the unconditional mean of , even though the rms uncertainty over
next period  decreases with age.
Case 1: Hiring Cost: PH > 0, PF = 0
Because the rm starts at the hiring margin, we must have MB0 = PH at entry, and
MB 2

0; PH

, for all subsequent periods,  = 1; 2; : : : , with the two extremes of the interval
representing ring and hiring of workers, respectively. Consider rst a situation where exit is
not allowed. Under this assumption, (9) would become
MB =
 
F 0 (L ) 

   w

+ EMB+1
For the entry period, we have MB0 (0) = PH , which implies that the rm will start smaller
20 In the discussion that follows, the hiring cost applies both to regular hiring and to hiring at entry and the
ring cost applies both to regular ring and to ring at exit.
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when PH > 0 than when PH = 0.21 Since MB1 (1) 2

0; PH

, E0 (MB1) < PH and thus
we must have pF 0 (L0)   w > 0, for all  2 (0; 1), if PH > 0. In the following period, rms
will adjust upwards as frequently with PH > 0 as when PH = 0, because they start at the
hiring margin and E01 = 

0, even though they might have smaller magnitudes of adjustment
due to the hiring cost. The proportional hiring cost implies that rms will adjust downwards
only if 1 < 
SD
1 , so that there is a region of inaction when P
H > 0 that is not present when
PH = 0. That is, rms hire fewer workers initially because the resulting smaller probability of
having to re them, and therefore wasting the initial hiring cost, compensates for the expected
decrease in prots this period. Consequently, in period 1 more rms will hire than re, and
this tendency towards growth in young rms will persist for several periods.
The Bayesian learning mechanism implies both persistence and a reduction in variance
with age in the Markov process associated with . The e¤ect of persistence, that is, the fact
that E
 
+1 j  ; 

=  , was analyzed in the previous paragraph. The reduced uncertainty
in the posterior estimate of productivity will be reected in a smaller inaction region as rms
accumulate information on realized productivity; that is, SU decreases with  . This causes an
increase in E (MB+1) for those rms already at the hiring margin, which must be balanced
by an increase in L for the right hand side of (9) to remain equal to PH . As rms become
more certain about their true productivity they are more willing to adjust to their long run
optimal size. Because most rms are at the hiring margin, this will cause a further increase
in average size.
Consider now the possibility of exit. In this case, the uncertainty reduction as the rm
ages implies a decrease in the exit probability, and a further increase in the future-periods
component ofMB in (9). Consequently, L needs to increase further in order to o¤set that.22
On the other hand, the smaller exit probability implies less pruning of ine¢ cient slow-growing
rms as a cohort ages, which tends to make growth in average rm size smaller. Therefore, we
will have less cohort growth due to non-survivors and more cohort growth due to survivors,
so that survivorscontribution to average rm growth in the cohort should increase when exit
is allowed.
Case 2: Firing Cost: PF > 0, PH = 0
In this case we have MB0 = 0, MB 2
 PF ; 0,  = 1; 2; : : : . Assume rst that exit is
not allowed. The intuition is the same as in case 1. In comparison with PF = 0, when PF > 0
rms start smaller and subsequently hire more frequently than they re. As rms age, the
reduction in variance of  causes an increase in E (MB+1), which must be compensated by
an increase in L for rms at the hiring margin. When exit is possible, those e¤ects become
more intense, since the exit probability will decrease as rms age.
21When exit is not allowed, we can prove that V S is concave (and continuously di¤erentiable) in L, so that
L0 must decrease for MB0 to increase.
22This e¤ect is similar to that of Cabral (1995).
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From the heuristic intuition we have just given it becomes clear that proportional hiring
and proportional ring costs reinforce each other in creating incentives for rms to grow.
In the end, our assessment of the relevance of linear adjustment costs for rm growth will
depend on how well a pure selection model can t the empirical evidence, and on how much
adjustment costs improve the t. Before we move into a quantitative assessment, we present
analytical results for a simple version of the general model.
4 Model with One-Period Learning Horizon and No Exit
In this section, we analyze a model where rmse¢ ciency is revealed after the rst period of
life and where rmslifetime horizon is know with certainty at entry. We assume that rms
live for T periods, T 2 f2; : : : ;1g, and that no exit is allowed prior to age T . These two
simplications allow us to determine the e¤ect of linear adjustment costs on rm growth.
The introduction of adjustment costs implies an additional expected operating cost for
entering rms. Therefore, the equilibrium price must increase to generate higher expected
future prots that compensate for the costs incurred while adjusting to optimal size. As a
consequence, pre-entry pruning of ine¢ cient rms should increase while post-entry pruning
should decrease. This is optimal from a social point of view, since with higher adjustment
costs there should be less experimentation in order to save in unrecoverable costs. Therefore,
the assumption that exit is exogenous is not critical for the results in this section. Since
adjustment costs attenuate post-entry pruning, even if exit was endogenous to the model,
the relative contribution of survivors to growth in the cohorts average size would increase
through this channel. By eliminating any exit prior to T we focus only on the incentives for
survivors to grow.
To formulate the problem, we use the fact that once the rm learns its true e¢ ciency
in period 2, it will adjust once and for all to its long run employment level, and it will not
adjust in any of the following periods.23 Therefore, assuming that upon exit at age T the rm
recovers its initial investment net of exit costs, the optimization problem in period 2 is
V S (L1; 

2) = max
L2
n

 
T

(L2; 

2)  CS (L2; L1) +  T 1V EX (L2)
o
(10)
where  T 
P T 2
s=0 
s =

1   T 1

= (1  ), and CS and V EX are dened as above. In
period 1, we then have
V EN (1) = max
L1

(L1; 

1)  CEN (L1) + E1

V S (L1; 

2)
	
:
Finally, the equilibrium price is determined by the condition that potential entrants break
23This result is formalized in proposition 10 below.
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even, i.e., E0

V EN (1)

= I.
We examine the impact of adjustment costs on the log growth rate of employment, rather
than the standard growth rate, in order to attenuate the e¤ect of Jensens inequality on rm
growth.24 In this simple model, the inaction region of optimal employment can be expressed
as an interval: SN =

SD; SU

. Therefore, the average log growth rate between period 1
and period 2, conditional on 1, is dened as
g (1) = E [ln (L

2)  ln (L1)] =Z SD
1

ln
 
LSD2
  ln (L1)	 dF1 (2) + Z 2
SU

ln
 
LSU2
  ln (L1)	 dF1 (2)
where   [1; 2] is the support of the distribution of 2, and SD (L1) and SU (L1) are
the frontiers between non-adjustment and downward and upward adjustment, respectively.
Depending on the specic value of 1 and the magnitude of the adjustment cost parameters,
we might have SD (L1) = 1 and/or 
SU (L1) = 2. However, in the results that follow, we
assume that 1 and the adjustment cost parameters are such that both downward adjustment
and upward adjustment occur with positive probability, i.e., SD (L1) > 1 and 
SU (L1) < 2.
Since we assume exogenous exit, we ignore the indirect e¤ect of adjustment costs that works
through changes in the equilibrium price, and implicitly assume that the research cost, I,
adjusts to maintain an equilibrium. This indirect price e¤ects inuence average rm size in
both periods, but are of second order importance for the average log-growth rate.25
Optimal employment in period 2 is determined by
L2 (L1; 

2) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
LSU2 = F 0 1
 
w+
T 1PF
 T
+P
H
 T
2
!
, 2 > 
SU (L1)
LSN2 = L1, 
SU (L1)  2  SD (L1)
LSD2 = F 0 1
 
w+
T 1PF
 T
 PF
 T
2
!
, SD (L1) > 2
where the frontiers of adjustment are dened as
SU (L1) 
w + 
T 1PF
 T
+ P
H
 T
F 0 (L1)
, SD (L1) =
w + 
T 1PF
 T
  PF T
F 0 (L1)
.
Note that the numerator of SU equals the pro-rated per-period cost of adding another worker,
24As we saw above, when optimal employment is a convex function of , Jensens inequality implies positive
expected growth, even in the absence of adjustment costs. Because the log transformation is concave, it will
o¤set the convexity of the optimal employment function. For example, for a Cobb-Douglas specication of
F (), the log growth rate eliminates the e¤ect of Jensens inequality, since ln (L ) becomes linear in  .
25 In proposition 8 below, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas the indirect price e¤ects cancel out.
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including the wage, the marginal hiring cost, and the discounted cost of ring the worker after
period T . The numerator of SD has a similar interpretation, as the benet of shedding a
worker.
We then have the following result concerning the e¤ects of changes in PH and PF on the
cohorts average log growth rate of employment.
Proposition 8 Assuming that F (L) is Cobb-Douglas and that SD (L1) > 1 and 
SU (L1) <
2:26
(a) The marginal e¤ect of PH on g (1), assuming PF is zero, is positive for a high enough
value of T .
(b) The marginal e¤ect of PF on g (1), assuming PH is zero, is positive for all T .
Proof. See appendix A.
Consider rst the hiring cost. In the proof, we show that an increase in PH decreases
both L1 and LSU2 . The impact of PH on the growth rate depends on two opposing e¤ects.
First, while in the case of LSU2 the cost of hiring can be equally spread out over T  1 periods
with certainty, in the case of L1 it will be spread out over either T periods or one period,
depending on whether the rm learns in period 2 that it has overhired. Therefore, ex ante
a proportionately greater part of PH is attached to period 1 in the case of L1 than in the
case of LSU2 , a¤ecting more L1 than LSU2 . This explains the positive e¤ect on growth of PH
for T = 1. Second, the hiring cost on L1 can possibly be spread out over T periods, while
the hiring cost on LSU2 can only be spread out over T   1 periods. This a¤ects more LSU2
than L1, and explains why the e¤ect of PH on growth is not necessarily positive for nite T .
However, as T increases the rst e¤ect dominates so that PH decreases L1 more than LSU2
and growth increases.27
With respect to PF there is always a positive e¤ect on growth, independently of the
lifetime horizon. This occurs because an increase in PF decreases L1 and increases LSD2 .
This positive e¤ect always dominates the uncertain e¤ect due to the fact that LSU2 also
decreases with PF .
When there are both hiring and ring costs and these costs are identical (PH = PF = P ),
then an increase in P has a positive e¤ect on g (1), for su¢ ciently high T , where the required
T is lower than in item (a) of proposition 8.
26 In the proof, we consider a general production function and then specialize to a Cobb-Douglas specication
in order to obtain the sign of the e¤ect. From that general setup, we can say that the form of the production
function should not be determinant for these results when the elasticity of the marginal product of labor does
not change much with the amount of labor used.
27 In our simulations, T = 3 was enough to generate a positive e¤ect on growth.
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5 Calibration/Estimation Under Finite Learning Horizon
In the previous two sections, we developed heuristic and some formal arguments about the
e¤ect of adjustment costs on the incentives for rms to start smaller and grow faster after
entry. In this section, we assess the contribution of adjustment costs to explain some of the
basic facts on rm dynamics found in section 2, both for the overall economy and for the
manufacturing and services sectors. To accomplish this, we perform a calibration/estimation
of the model using computational methods.
To simulate the innite learning horizon model we follow the suggestion of Lars Ljungqvist
and Thomas Sargent (2004) and consider an approximation where rms live forever, but learn
their ex post true productivity component, 1, with certainty at some age T .
28
We assume that F is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., F (L) = L,  2 (0; 1). Under this assumption,
when adjustment is costless, optimal employment is given by
L = L (

 ; ) = L (

 ) 

p
w
 1
1 
, if   EX , (11)
where EX is the productivity exit threshold. Therefore, with  2 (0; 1), optimal employment
conditional on survival is a convex function of  , so that Jensens inequality implies growth
of employment even if there is no selection. As in the previous section, in order to avoid
any growth due to Jensens inequality, we take logs of all variables and analyze the e¤ects of
adjustment costs on the log-growth rate.
Concerning the productivity distribution, we assume that  is lognormally distributed,
i.e.,  () = exp fg.29 This assumption is made for computational simplicity, and it seems
reasonable on empirical grounds (see Bee Aw, Xiaomin Chen and Mark Roberts 2004). In
addition, this assumption is not critical as the results in section 4 suggest that the distribution
of productivity mostly a¤ects the intensity of the e¤ect of adjustment costs on rm growth,
but not the sign. In fact, proposition 8 is derived independently of the particular distribution
of  . With the log-normal distribution assumption, the transition law for the 
s is as follows.
Proposition 9 Let  = exp fg be generated as in assumption 1. Then,
(a) The posterior distribution of +j (j  0), given the information set at time  , 
 =
n
0;
fsg 1s=0
o
if  < T , and 
 = f0; 1g if   T , is
+j j
 logN
 
Y ; Z + 
2

,
28Note that this T di¤ers from the lifetime horizon T used in section 4, with T  T . In this section, we
assume an innite horizon, so that T = 1. In our simulations below, we assume that T = 15 (years), and
present results until year 10.
29Under log-normality, 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. Although this violates assumption 1, this is not a problem in
this section, since we will be using a discrete approximation to the productivity distribution.
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where, for  < T , Y and Z are dened in (2), and, for   T , Y =  and Z = 0. Let
 = E ( j 
 ) = E ( j  ; ). Then the distribution of +j (j  1) given ( ; ) is
+j j( ;) logN

ln ( ) 
1
2
(Z   Z+j) ; Z   Z+j

.
Also, the unconditional distribution of  (  0) is
  logN

 +
1
2
 
Z + 
2

; 2   Z

,
where 2 = 
2
0
+ 21.
Proof. See appendix A.
Since we assume that the rm enters the industry already knowing its ex ante productivity
component 0 (see assumption 1), we will get a non-degenerate distribution of initial size. This
occurs because L0 = L0 (

0), and 

0 has positive variance in the cohorts initial distribution.
The next proposition analyzes the properties of the optimization problem after  is revealed
to the rm in period T .
Proposition 10 If  is revealed to the rm at period T , then all adjustments are made at
period T , and the rm will not change its exit and employment decisions after that period.
This means that
V S (T ; LT 1; T ) = max
L

1
1  (L; 

T )  CS (L;LT 1)

, (12)
Ls = L
 (T ; LT 1; T ) , s  T , T = 1

V S (T ; LT 1; T ) < V
EX (LT 1)

.
Proof. See appendix A.
This result enables us to simplify the computational algorithm signicantly, since it implies
a nite horizon dynamic programming problem. In appendix B, we present some details
concerning the computational algorithm used to simulate the model. In the next subsection,
we partially calibrate and estimate the learning model with costly adjustment, and in the
following subsection we do a sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Calibration and Estimation of Model with Costly Adjustment
We calibrate and estimate our model to match statistics from the 1988 cohort of entering rms,
both for the overall economy and the manufacturing and service sectors. We rst calibrate
parameters related to inputs directly from the data. We then use a form of the method of
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moments to estimate the parameters associated with the learning process and the adjustment
cost. These estimates are obtained so that the model generated moments match the evolution
of rm size, of exit rates, and of the survivor component observed in the data. As discussed
in appendix B, we nd the set of parameter values that minimize the method of moments
objective function by using a simulated annealing method. This optimization method is robust
to local minima, to discontinuities, and to the discretization implemented in order to simulate
the model.30 A central element to our estimation strategy is a decomposition of the change
in the cohorts average size into a survivor component and a non-survivor component. This
decomposition forces the model to match not only the growth in the cohorts average size but
also the contribution of surviving and non-surviving rms to that growth. Similarly to section
2, with l  ln (L ), our decomposition is dened as
E [l j S ]  E [l0 j S0] = E [l   l0 j S ]| {z }
Survivor Component
+ Pr (D j S0) fE [l0 j S ]  E [l0 j D ]g| {z }
Non-Survivor Component
(13)
Prior to estimation, we calibrate some parameters. The parameters  and w are cali-
brated with data from INE (1997) containing the Inquérito Annual às Empresas from 1990 to
1995. These data are considered reliable and cover all rms in the Portuguese economy, with
sampling among rms with less than 20 workers. We measure  as the 1990-1995 average of
the cost share of labor in value added, and w as the 1990-1995 average cost per worker. We
can also obtain these values at the one-digit sectoral level. We deate all nominal variables
using the GDP sectoral price indices available in the updated version of Séries Longas para
a Economia Portuguesa in Banco de Portugal (1997). The real interest rate is calibrated as
the 1990-1995 average of the implicit real interest rate on public debt transactions on the
secondary market of the Lisbon Stock Exchange. The data was also taken from Banco de
Portugal (1997). We deate the nominal interest rates using the December-to-December con-
sumer price index from INE (1990-5). The discount rate is then obtained as  = 11+r , where
r is the average real interest rate.
The remaining parameters, , 0 , 1 , , W , and P are estimated using a method of
moments estimator, which attempts to make the model match closely the evidence on cohort
dynamics presented in section 2. In particular, the estimates are selected to minimize a
weighted sum of the distance between the following moments in the model and the data:
(a) the time-series of the cross-sectional mean of log-employment conditional on survival,
E [l j S ]; (b) the time-series of annual changes in the cross-sectional standard deviation of
log-employment conditional on survival, SD [l j S ]; (c) the time-series of the cumulative exit
rate, Pr (D j S0); (d) and the time-series of the survivor component, as dened in (??). In
30The objective function is dened as Q =

N 1
PN
i=1 fi
0
 1

N 1
PN
i=1 fi

, where N 1
P
fi is a vector
of di¤erences between the sample and model generated moments, and  is the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of fi.
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Table 4: Calibration/Estimation: 1988 Firm Cohort
Parameter
All Manufacturing Services
NAC AC NAC AC NAC AC
 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.73 0.73
 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956
w 11.8 11.8 13.1 13.1 7.5 7.5
 3.227 3.180 3.435 3.607 2.408 2.455
0 0.218 0.205 0.257 0.188 0.143 0.122
1 0.259 0.255 0.261 0.253 0.153 0.137
 0.571 0.656 0.558 0.526 0.359 0.314
W 668.4 775.3 1136.4 1291.1 179.8 189.0
P 0 0.70 0 1.13 0 0.11
I 122.5 76.5 180.7 224.1 22.2 18.6
Q 0.0861 0.0629 0.1727 0.1236 0.0480 0.0439
Notes: NAC refers to no-adjustment-costs case; AC refers to proportional-
adjustment-costs case; Q is the value of the objective function.
estimating the above parameters, the output price is normalized to 1, and the initial research
cost, I, is obtained by the equilibrium condition I = E (V0 (0)).31
The decision to estimate W , instead of calibrating it, deserves some discussion. First, the
main purpose of this parameter is to induce endogenous exit as it represents the rms oppor-
tunity cost of remaining in activity. In Hopenhayn (1992), the same result is accomplished
using a xed per period operating cost. Since the per period operating cost can be seen as the
periodic payment in an annuity with a present discounted value of W , the two mechanisms
are equivalent. Second, because Quadros de Pessoal misses any reliable capital stock variable,
we consider the capital decision to be exogenous. A rough estimate of the magnitude of W
is the present discounted value of an annuity with annual payments equal to the 1990-1995
average of value added minus labor costs, using the same deators as for w.32 Because the
sample is biased towards surviving rms, this measure overestimates the value of W , and we
cannot use it as a reference to calibrate W . Consequently, we estimate W jointly with the
remaining parameters in the model.
We present in table 4 the calibrated and estimated parameters for the three cohorts and
the model with (AC ) and without (NAC ) adjustment costs, and in gure 2 we plot the overall
economy data moments and the equivalent moments in the AC and NAC models. From table
4, we verify that more information is revealed ex post (1 > 0), and that there is signicant
noise in the learning process ( > 0 ,  > 1). For the overall economy cohort, the AC
model implies an estimate for the proportional cost of about 5:9% of the annual wage. As
31To make the computation of equilibrium easier for a given set of parameters, instead of changing the
output price we change the xed research cost so that the condition E
 
V EN

= I is satised.
32The estimates are 1373:8 for the overall economy cohort, 3317:1 for the manufacturing cohort, and 269:1
for the services cohort.
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can be seen in gure 2, this proportional cost improves noticeably the t of the survivor
component.
Figure 2 shows that although the NAC model can generate moments on rm size and
exit rates that are close to equivalent empirical moments, it cannot satisfactorily match the
empirical survivorscontribution. That is, the NAC model cannot explain the main source
of growth in the cohorts average size, since survivors contribute much more to growth in the
data than in the NAC model. This shortcoming occurs especially in the initial years after
entry as the path of the survivor component is almost at in the data, whereas it is increasing
in the NAC model. The larger initial distance between the NAC model and the data in terms
of the survivor component reects the fact that, in the absence of adjustment costs, learning
has a larger initial impact on the exit of small ine¢ cient rms than on growth of survivors.
In table 4, we also calibrate/estimate the AC and NAC models for the manufacturing and
services sectors, and in gure 3 we present a summary of the implied moments. In discussing
the results for the two sectors we consider the estimates for the AC model. Firms in man-
ufacturing initially learn relatively less about their e¢ ciency than rms in services (0=1
is smaller in manufacturing), and adjustment costs need to be relatively higher in manufac-
turing than in services to account for the much higher survivor component in manufacturing
(the proportional costs amount to 8:6% and 1:5% of the annual wage, respectively). The
higher adjustment costs and smaller knowledge about their e¢ ciency at entry, implies higher
incentives for manufacturing rms to start smaller and to gradually adjust to optimal size as
they survive and their uncertainty is resolved. Firms in manufacturing also pay a relatively
higher initial research cost (I=W is higher). This, together with the smaller initial knowledge
about their e¢ ciency (0=1 is smaller), implies that manufacturing rms are more likely
to enter the industry at the research phase (1   Pr(S0) equals 27:2% in manufacturing and
46:5% in services).
While the introduction of adjustment costs clearly improves the t of the survivor compo-
nent in the model, we cannot claim that the proportional cost explains completely the path
of the survivor component in the data. In fact, in all three cohorts the initial growth of
survivors seems larger than the AC model can explain. Additionally, in the manufacturing
sector, although the AC model raises noticeably the contribution of survivors relative to the
NAC model, the survivor component generated by the AC model is still somewhat below
the survivor component in the data. Several factors could be behind these results. First, the
introduction of a xed entry or xed exit cost would improve the t of the AC model. By
introducing a wedge between the costof entry and the benetof exit, these xed costs
would help to control both the fraction of rms that never enter the industry, 1   Pr (S0),
and the amount of exit in the initial post-entry periods, Pr (D1 j S0). As these xed costs
increase, the rst fraction increases and the second probability decreases due to a larger initial
selection. Therefore, these xed costs would allow more freedom in adjusting 0=1 to ac-
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Figure 2: Firm Dynamics for Overall Economy Cohort
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Figure 3: Firm Dynamics for Manufacturing and Services Cohorts
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count for the long-run survivor component, without distorting much the initial exit rates. The
proportional adjustment cost would also increase, raising the long-run value of the survivor
component and making its path atter. Second, other theories that emphasize rm growth
in the rst years after entry, namely those based on nancing constraints, can certainly also
account for the high value of the survivor component, especially in the manufacturing sector.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we explain some aspects of the calibration/estimation exercise and provide
a detailed sensitivity analysis to all parameters in the model. First, we do not attempt
to match the level of the cross-sectional variance of log-employment, but only its change
over time. This is because to t the dispersion in employment, the model would require
substantially larger values for both 0 and 1 . This would allow the model to match
V ar [l j S ] and Pr (D j S0), but would imply an excessive rate of growth in E [l j S ].
However, this shortcoming is not a serious problem. It implies that only a fraction of the
observed cohorts employment dispersion can be attributed to a Bayesian learning process
about e¢ ciency. The remaining part could be attributed to heterogeneity in the initial choice
of technology.
For instance, consider a model where capital is endogenous and suppose that a rm chooses
its initial stock of capital, K0, based on the realization of a random variable indexing technol-
ogy choice. Assume further that, after selecting K0, the rm keeps its capital stock unchanged
for the remainder of its life. If the production function has constant returns to scale, if the
total opportunity cost is proportional to K0, i.e., ~W = WK0, then we can easily prove that
~V (K0; L 1;  ; ) = K0V

Lt 1
K0
;  ; 

, where ~V is the value function conditional on the cho-
sen K0. Therefore, in this alternative framework, dispersion in K0 would govern the initial
dispersion in employment and only the subsequent evolution in employment dispersion would
depend on the Bayesian learning process. This is the reason why we attempt to match only
the evolution of SD [l j S ], but not its level. In the estimated models presented in table 4
only little less than 40% of the observed dispersion in the cohorts log-employment can be
attributed to the learning process.33
Second, the value of 0=1 a¤ects the long-run contribution of survivors, since a rel-
atively smaller initial dispersion would make the average size of exiting rms closer to the
average size of surviving rms in the entry period, and in this case most growth would be
due to survivors. In the aforementioned extended model with an initial choice over K0, if we
had 0 = 0 we would have a non-degenerate initial distribution of size, entirely due to the
heterogeneity in K0, but the survivorscomponent would be 100% in each period. This would
occur because the distribution of initial size among exiting rms would be equal to the distri-
33 In gure 2, we rescale the estimated initial values of SD [l j S ] to the level found in the data.
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bution of initial size among surviving rms. This also explains why even with heterogeneity
over K0, we would still need to assume 0 > 0 in order to match the empirical facts on the
importance of the survivor component.
While we could increase the long-run contribution of survivors by tinkering with the ratio
0=1 , without adjustment costs the model cannot match the observed atness in the path
of the survivor component. For any choice of 0 and 1 , it will always be the case that the
survivor component will exhibit an increasing path in the absence of adjustment costs. Note
also that the ratio 0=1 a¤ects both the exit rate and the evolution of the cross-sectional
rm size dispersion. If this ratio becomes too small, post-entry exit rates become excessively
high and the size dispersion increases too fast. This is the reason why in the NAC model
we cannot nd a value for this ratio that attains the long-run contribution of survivors found
in the data, and simultaneously matches the behavior of the cumulative exit rate and the
evolution of the cross-sectional size dispersion. Therefore, the value we select for this ratio is
disciplined by the exit rates and the evolution of rm size dispersion in the cohort.
Third, to show that proportional adjustment costs are crucial for our model to t the
evidence on the survivors contribution to growth in the cohorts average size, in gure 4
we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to each parameter in the model. We take as
benchmark the NAC model estimated for the overall economy cohort in which we do not
attempt to match the evidence on the survivor component.34
From gure 4, we see that the model with costless adjustment cannot match satisfactorily
the contribution of survivors to growth, even if we allow parameters (except for the propor-
tional cost) to vary one by one from their benchmark values. In fact, no other parameter
besides the proportional cost can shrink signicantly the distance between the survivor com-
ponent at di¤erent ages of the cohort without changing much the exit rates. The main e¤ect
of these costs is to put more emphasis on individual rm growth in the initial years of life,
when exit of ine¢ cient rms is very intense.35
To emphasize the role of the proportional adjustment cost in replicating the evidence on
the contribution of survivors, in gure 5 we present the impact of changes in P on the survivor
component, using as a benchmark the estimates for the AC model for the overall economy
cohort in table 4. We conclude that allowing for even a small value of P has a substantial
impact on the survivorscontribution, with a larger e¤ect in the initial years of life.
34The sensitivity analysis with a benchmark based on the overall economy NAC model in table 4 would
produce similar results.
35Note that we would not be able to identify the hiring/entry cost, PH , and the ring/exit cost, PF ,
separately, because PH and PF produce almost identical results. This should be expected as the incentives
created by proportional hiring/entry and ring/exit costs di¤er only in the displacement of time by one period.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that a model with learning about e¢ ciency and linear adjustment
costs generates incentives for entering rms to be smaller and for successful rms to expand
faster after entry. We present evidence on rm dynamics for a cohort of entrant rms in the
Portuguese economy. The evidence shows that growth in the cohortsaverage size is driven
largely by growth of survivors rather than by pruning of small ine¢ cient rms, with rapid
growth of survivors in the initial years after entry and with signicant di¤erences between
manufacturing and services in the contribution of survivors. A calibration and estimation of
the model reveals that the proportional adjustment cost is the key parameter to explain the
high contribution of survivors to growth in the cohortsaverage size. In order to explain the
higher contribution of survivors in manufacturing than in services, adjustment costs need to
be higher in manufacturing, both in absolute terms and in relation to the wage.
The paper proposes a channel through which linear adjustment costs to job creation and
job destruction can a¤ect rm size dynamics. Therefore, proportional costs not only make
job creation and job destruction more sluggish, but also a¤ect the lifetime dynamics of rm
size. Although our theory does not provide a complete explanation for the evidence on the
survivor component, the success of our model in better approximating the growth of survivors
as the main source for growth suggests that adjustment costs do play a signicant role in
rm size adjustments after entry. From our results, we conclude that selection theories are
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more relevant to explain rm exit than to explain growth of survivors. Financing constraints
theories should also play a role in explaining growth of survivors. Although there is not much
evidence that nancing constraints can explain cross-sector di¤erences in growth of survivors,
nancing constraints should be especially relevant when technology requires a large startup
cost, such as in manufacturing industries.
Angelini and Generale (forthcoming) argue that nancing constraints are not the main
determinant behind the evolution of the rm size distribution. Therefore, any government
intervention to eliminate nancing constraints might not change the lifetime dynamics of rm
size we nd in this paper. Furthermore, this paper suggests that, in sectors where adjustment
costs are high and learning is important, government policies aimed at curbing nancing
constraints might not produce the intended results, as rms under those circumstances have
incentives to start smaller and expand faster.
A Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 2 
 
n
0; fg0
o
can be summarized by ( ; ), and the distribution function F (

+1 j  ; )
is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of  .
Proof. From (2) we have
 = g (Y ; ) = E ( ( ) j Y ; ) = 1 +
Z 1
 1
[1  F ( j Y ; )] d ( ) ,
where F ( j Y ; ) is the posterior distribution of  . Because F ( j Y ; ) is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in Y , and  ( ) is strictly increasing in  , we conclude that g (Y ; ) is continuous and strictly
increasing in Y (see theorem 3.4.1 in Charles Swartz 1994). Therefore, for the purpose of predicting  ,

 

0; fsg 1s=0
	  fY ; g  f ; g, since Y = g 1Y ( ; ), where g 1Y is the inverse function of g with
respect to Y . Using the recursion
Y+1 =
 2
Z 1+1
 +
Z 1
Z 1+1
Y ,
the conditional distribution of +1 can be represented as
F (+1 j  ; ) = F
"
Z 1+1
 2
g 1Y (

+1;  + 1)  Z
 1

 2
g 1Y (

 ; ) j g 1Y ( ; ) ; 
#
,
since we need to integrate the density of  over the domain where g (Y+1;  + 1)  +1. From this, we
conclude that F (+1 j  ; ) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of  . Therefore, the transition
function associated with F (+1 j  ; ) is monotone and satises the Feller property (see pp. 376-9 in Nancy
Stokey and Robert Lucas with Edward Prescott 1989).
Proof of proposition 4. We use the following notation: (i) X  R+N0 and x  (L; ; ) 2 X, where
  [1; 2]  R+, 1  0, 2 < 1; (ii) T is the operator associated with (4); (iii) M denotes the following
operator 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; ) =
Z 2
1
max
n
V EX (L ) ; V
S (L ; 

+1;  + 1)
o
dF (+1 j  ; ) ;
(iv) V SO , V
SD
O , and V
SU
O denote the objective functions associated with V
S , V SD, and V SU ; that is, for
j = S; SD; SU
V jO (L ;L 1; 

 ; ) =  (L ; 

 )  Cj (L ; L 1) + 

MV S

(L ; 

 ; ) .
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We prove the proposition in several steps.
(a.i) Existence and Uniqueness: This follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem and Blackwells
su¢ cient conditions (see theorems 3.2 and 3.3 in Stokey et al. 1989).
(a.ii) Continuity in (L 1;  ): Let C12 (X) be the space of bounded functions on X which are continuous
in (L 1;  ). This is clearly a closed subset of B (X), the space of bounded functions V
S : X ! R. Since
B (X) with the sup norm
V S = supx2X V S (x) is a Banach space, then C12 (X) is also a Banach space.
Now consider V S 2 C12 (X). Because max

V EX ; V S
	
is also continuous and F ( 1 j  ; ) satises the
Feller property (see lemma 2), then MV S is continuous in (L ;  ) (see lemma 9.5 in Stokey et al. 1989). Since
(L ; 

 )  CS (L ; L 1) is continuous, then V SO (L ;L 1;  ; ) is continuous in (L ;L 1;  ). Therefore,
applying the maximum theorem, we conclude that V S (L 1;  ; ) is continuous in (L 1; 

 ). Note that the
set of admissible values for employment can be made compact. First, only non-negative values are acceptable for
employment. Second, we can choose a value for L high enough, say LUB , such that LSU (L 1; 

 ; )  LUB ,
for all L 1  LUB , so that all values of interest are considered. LUB is nite since F 0 (1) = 0, and MV S is
bounded. Therefore, V S as dened by (4) is continuous in (L 1;  ).
(a.iii) Strict Monotonicity in  : From lemma 2 (the transition function associated with F (+1 j  ; ) is
monotone) if V S (L ; +1;  + 1) is weakly increasing in 

+1, then
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; ) is also weakly increasing
in  . Then, because (L ; 

 ) is strictly increasing in 

 (and the constraint set is not a¤ected by 

 ),
V S (L 1;  ; ) is strictly increasing in 

 (see theorem 9.11 in Stokey et al. 1989).
(b) Exit Policy : The exit policy is determined by the condition
V EX (L 1)  V S (L 1;  ; ) .
Because, for each L 1, V EX is constant and V S is strictly increasing in  , then it is obvious that 
EX (L 1; )
is a unique function dened by the value of  2 [1; 2] that satises the above equation, if it exists, or by
1, when V EX (L) < V S (L; 1; ), or by 2, when V EX (L) > V S (L; 2; ). Because both V EX and V S are
continuous functions, then EX is also a continuous function in L.
Proposition 5 Let T be the maximum allowed age, so that a rm entering in period 0 must exit the industry
at the end of period T . Then Pr
 
+1 2 DT (L ;  + 1) j  ; 

= 1, for all L 2 R+,  2

0; : : : ; T   1	 where
DT (L ;  + 1) =
n
+1 2  : V ST (L ; +1;  + 1) is di¤erentiable at L
o
.
Consequently, the objective functions associated with V SDT and V
SU
T are continuously di¤erentiable in L, and
all optima are interior in the region of their denition.36
Proof of proposition 5. We prove this by induction. In period T , we have
V ST
 
L T 1; 

T ; T

= max
L T
n
(L T ; 

T )  CS (L T ; L T 1) + V EX (L T )
o
,
so that V SDT;O, V
SN
T and V
SU
T;O are continuously di¤erentiable functions of L T , L T 1, and L T , respectively. Since
V SDT;O
 
L;L; ; T

= V SNT
 
L; ; T

, V SUT;O
 
L;L; ; T

= V SNT
 
L; ; T

, F 0
 
0+

= 1, F 0 (1) = 0, and V EX
is bounded above, then V SDT;O and V
SU
T;O have interior optima in the regions of denition of V
SD
T and V
SU
T .
Therefore, those optima are independent of L T 1, and we must have @V
SD
T =@L T 1 =  P , @V SUT =@L T 1 = P ,
in the regions of their denition, and
@V SNT
@L T 1
= F 0 (L T 1) 

T   w   P .
We conclude that V ST
 
L T 1; 

T ;
T

is continuously di¤erentiable at L T 1 2 R+, with probability one (given
F
  j T 1; T   1 and for all T 1 2 ).
Now consider a generic period  2 1; : : : ; T   1	, and assume that V ST (L ; +1;  + 1) is continuously
di¤erentiable at L 2 R+ with probability one. Because EX (L ;  + 1) is a unique continuous function
36A similar result would hold for the case of innite-lived rms that face a nite learning horizon, as in
sections 4 and 5. However, in this case we would need to use proposition 10 rst.
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of L, we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to conclude that
 
MV ST

(L ; 

 ; ) is continuously
di¤erentiable at L , for all  2  (see theorems 3.2.16 and 3.4.3 in Swartz 1994). Consequently, the same
argument used for period T can be repeated here.
Proof of proposition 6. For given (L 1; ) we partition the state-space associated with  , , into regions
of exit, EX , downward adjustment, SD, non-adjustment, SN , and upward adjustment, SU :37
EX (L 1; ) =
n
 : V EX > V S
o
,
SD (L 1; ) =
n
 2  : V SD > V SN , V SD  V SU , V SD  V EX
o
,
SN (L 1; ) =
n
 2  : V SN  V SD, V SN  V SU , V SN  V EX
o
,
SU (L 1; ) =
n
 2  : V SU > V SN , V SU  V SD, V SU  V EX
o
.
If it is optimal for the rm to adjust upwards, then we must solve
ASU =

F 0 (L ) 

   (w + P )

+ 
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; )
@L
= 0,
and if it is optimal for the rm to adjust downwards, we must solve
ASD =

F 0 (L ) 

   (w   P )

+ 
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; )
@L
= 0
Now, the derivative can be rewritten as
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; )
@L
=
Z
EX
@V EX ()
@L
dF (+1 j  ; ) +
Z
SD
@V SD ()
@L
dF (+1 j  ; )
+
Z
SN
@V SN ()
@L
dF (+1 j  ; ) +
Z
SU
@V SU ()
@L
dF (+1 j  ; ) ,
where some of the regions might be empty, and in separating the integrals we have taken into account the
continuity of the integrand in MV S at the frontiers.
For each of the above derivatives we have
@V EX (L )
@L
=  P ,
@V SD ()
@L

+12SD(L ;+1)
=  P = F 0 (L+1) +1   w+  @  MV S (L+1; +1;  + 1)
@L
,
@V SN ()
@L
=

F 0 (L ) 

+1   w

+ 
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

+1;  + 1)
@L
,
@V SU ()
@L

+12SU (L ;+1)
= P =

F 0 (L+1) 

+1   w

+ 
@
 
MV S

(L+1; 

+1;  + 1)
@L
,
where we have used the fact that ASU = 0, when it is optimal to adjust upwards, and ASD = 0, when it is
37 In SD and SU we need to use V SD > V SU and V SU > V SD because V S , in general, is not concave in
L.
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optimal to adjust downwards. Therefore, we have
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; )
@L
= E
 
+1 ( P ) +
 
1  +1
(
F 0 (L+1) 

+1   w

+

@
 
MV S

(L+1; 

+1;  + 1)
@L
)!
,
Using the law of iterated expectations, we can rewrite the above as
@
 
MV S

(L ; 

 ; )
@L
=
1X
s=1
E
s 1 ~+s ( P ) + ^+s F 0 (L+s) +s   w	 ,
The result now follows by plugging this expression in ASU , and ASD.
Proof of corollary 7. We can rewrite the LHS of (6) and (7) as follows
MB =
 
F 0 (L ) 

   w

+ E ~

+1 ( P ) + E
(
^+1
 
F 0 (L+1) 

+1   w

+
1X
s=1
E+1
s ~+1+s ( P ) + ^+1+s  F 0 (L+1+s) +1+s   w
)
:
Taking into account that ^+1~

+1+s = ~

+1+s, ^

+1^

+1+s = ^

+1+s, ^

+1 = 1  +1, and ~+1 = +1,
then we get the stated result.
Proof of proposition 8. With proportional costs, optimal employment at entry is determined by
F 0 (L1) 

1  

w + PH

+ 
 Z SD
1
 PF dF1 (

2)+
Z SU
SD
n
 T

F 0 (L1) 

2   w
   T 1PFo dF1 (2) + Z 2
SU
PHdF1 (

2)
!
= 0
(a) In the case of a proportional hiring cost, assuming PF = 0, we have
L1 = F
0 1

w
SD

= F 0 1
0@w + PH T
SU
1A ,
@L1
@PH
=
F 0 (L1)
F 00 (L1)
~wH
w ~ww + PH ~wH
,
~ww = 1 +  T
h
F1

SU

  F1

SD
i
, ~wH = 1  
h
1  F1

SU
i
.
After some algebra we get
@g
@PH
=   1
Fel (L1)
~wH
w ~ww + PH ~wH
F1

SD

 Z 2
SU

1
Fel (L1)
~wH
w ~ww + PH ~wH
  1
Fel (LSU2 )
1
w T + PH

dF1 (

2) ,
where Fel (L) = F 00 (L)L=F 0 (L) stands for the elasticity of the marginal product of labor. If F (L) = AL,
we have Fel = (  1), and the above expression simplies to
@g
@PH
= (1  ) 1
 
~wH
w ~ww + PH ~wH
n
F1

SD

+
h
1  F1

SU
io
  1
w
 
T

+ PH
h
1  F1

SU
i!
,
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which is positive when T is high enough so that
w
n
 TF1

SD

   T 1
h
1  F1

SU
io
+ PH
n
1  
h
1  F1

SU
io
F1

SD

> 0
(b) In the case of a proportional ring cost, assuming PH = 0, we get similarly
@g
@PF
=
Z SD
1
8<: 1Fel (LSD2 ) 
T 1   1
w T +


T 1   1

PF
  1
Fel (L1)
 ~wF
w ~ww + PF ~wF
9=; dF1 (2)+
Z 2
SU
(
1
Fel (LSU2 )

T 1
w T + 
T 1PF
  1
Fel (L1)
 ~wF
w ~ww + PF ~wF
)
dF1 (

2) ,
where
~ww = 1 +  T
h
F1

SU

  F1

SD
i
~wF = F1

SD

+ 
T 1
h
F1

SU

  F1

SD
i
Under the assumption that marginal productivity is always positive, we need PF < w
1  or otherwise the
rm would prefer to pay the worker his lifetime salary, instead of ring him. If F (L) = AL, we have
F 0= (LF 00) = (  1) 1, and the above expression simplies to
@g
@PH
= (1  ) 1
0@  ~wF
w ~ww + PF ~wF
n
F1

SD

+
h
1  F1

SU
io
 

T 1   1
w T +


T 1   1

PF
F1

SD

  
T 1
w T + 
T 1PF
h
1  F1

SU
i1A
which is positive for all T .
Proof of proposition 9. The result concerning the posterior distribution of +j follows directly from
ln (+j) j
=  j
 +"+j ,  j
 N (Y ; Z ) .
For the distribution of +j conditional on (

 ; ), we use the fact that
ln
 
+j
 j
= Y+j j
 +12  Z+j + 2
Y+j = 
 2Z+j
+j 1X
s=
s +
Z+j
Z
Y ,
Z+j = Z    2Z+jZ j,
s j
 N
 
Y ; Z + 
2 , Cov (s; s0 j 
+ ) = V ar ( j 
 ) = Z , s, s0   , s 6= s0
so that, in the end, we get
E

ln
 
+j
 j 
  = Y + 1
2
 
Z+j + 
2 ,
V ar

ln
 
+j
 j 
  = Z   Z+j .
From here the result follows by noting that ln ( ) = Y +
1
2
 
Z + 
2

.
For the unconditional distribution, just note that ln ( ) is a sum of normal random variables, and that
E [ln ( )] =  +
1
2
 
Z + 
2
V ar [ln ( )] = 
2
0
+ (Z0   Z )
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Proof of proposition 10.
After period T   1 the optimization problem is time invariant, since there is no uncertainty concerning E ().
Therefore, for periods s, s  T , we have
V S (T ; Ls 1; T ) = max
Ls0;s2f0;1g
nh
(Ls; 

T )  CS (Ls; Ls 1)
i
+

n
s
h
W   CEX (L+s)
i
+ (1  s)V S (T ; Ls; T )
oo
.
Consider a rm that is in the industry at time s, s  T . We now prove that this rm will not change its
employment level in period s+ 1. For this, we use the easily proven fact that it is less costly to adjust in one
step than in two steps, i. e.,
CS (Ls+1; L

s) + C
S (Ls ; Ls 1)  CS (Ls+1; Ls 1) ,
where Ls = Ls (

T ; Ls 1; T ). We then have
(Ls+1; 

T )  CS (Ls+1; Ls) + max
n
V EX (Ls+1) ; V
S (T ; Ls+1)
o
 (Ls+1; T )  CS (Ls+1; Ls 1) + max
n
V EX (Ls+1) ; V
S (T ; Ls+1)
o
+ CS (Ls ; Ls 1)
 V S (T ; Ls 1) + CS (Ls ; Ls 1)
=  (Ls ; 

T )  CS (Ls ; Ls 1) + max
n
V EX (Ls) ; V
S (T ; L

s)
o
+ CS (Ls ; Ls 1)
= V SN (T ; L

s) .
Therefore, at time s+ 1 it is optimal to set Ls+1 = L

s .
We now prove that the rm does not exit at time s+ 1 after remaining in the industry at time s, s  T .
Because the rm stays at time s, then V S (T ; L

s 1; T )  V EX (Ls 1). Now assume that in period s+ 1 the
rm exits, so that
V S (T ; L

s ; T ) < V
EX (Ls), (Ls ; T ) < (1  )V EX (Ls) .
This then implies
V S (T ; L

s 1; T ) < (1  )V EX (Ls)  CS (Ls ; Ls 1) + V EX (Ls)
= V EX (Ls)  CS (Ls ; Ls 1)  V EX (Ls 1)
which is a contradiction.
B Appendix: Computational Algorithm and EstimationMethod
We describe the algorithm we use to numerically simulate and estimate the nite learning horizon model in
several steps.
(i) Discretization and transition probability matrices associated with :
We discretize  based on a uniform discrete approximation to the (cross-section) distribution of T =
exp
 
+ 1
2
2

, which is logN
 
+ 1
2
2; 2

. We then employ the method of George Tauchen (1986) in
order to build the transition matrices associated with this discrete approximation. We use a grid with
25 points.
(ii) Discretization of L
We have used the decision rules for problem (12) in case of hiring and in case of ring, from which we
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consider
l  ln (L)  N  L; 2L ,
L =
1
1  
(
 +
1
2
2 + ln
 
pp
[w + PSU + PEX ] [w   (1  )PSD]
!)
,
2L =
1
(1  )2 
2
.
For the mean of l  ln (L) we assume that if a rm is at the upper end of the grid for L, then it should
optimally decrease employment even at N , and that if a rm is at the lower end of the grid for L, then
it should optimally increase employment and exit next period, even at 1. We then nd the upper and
lower end of the grid for L such that those decisions occur, and use the same procedure to discretize L
as the one used for , considering 800 gridpoints.
(iii) Choice for T
We choose T = 15, and display results until period 10.
(iv) Model simulation
For a given set of parameters we numerically compute the optimal entry, employment, and exit policy
rules. In doing this, for each point in the grid for  we compute the optimal employment associated
with
~V SU ( ) = max
L
n
(Lt; 

 )  PL + E max
n
V EX (L ) ; V
S (L ; 

+1)
oo
~V SD ( ) = max
L
n
(Lt; 

 ) + PL + E max
n
V EX (L ) ; V
S (L ; 

+1)
oo
since these do not depend on L 1. In doing this, we rst nd the optimizer on the grid for L presented
in (ii). Then, we use this maximizer to implement a golden section method to nd a more precise
value for this maximizer.38 We then convert these value functions into V SU and V SD, determine the
inaction regions, and compute V S . With the optimal policy functions in hand, we generate a random
sample with 150; 000 lifetime histories of fg, and compute all endogenous decisions associated with
each realization of a rms lifetime history. We then use this information to compute by simulation the
relevant moments in the model.
(v) Moments used in estimation
We consider four sets of moments, computed among rms that actually enter the industry:
(a) Exit rate: For  2 f1; 2; 3; 5; 7; 9g, we consider
fai = 1
 
;i = 1
  Pr (D j S0)
(b) Average current size conditional on survival: For  2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 5; 7; 9g, we consider
fbi = l;i1
 
;i = 0
  E [l j S ] Pr (S j S0)
(c) Relative change in variance of current size conditional on survival: For  2 f1; 2; 3; 5; 7; 9g, we
consider39
fci = fl;i   E [l j S ]g2 1
 
;i = 0
  l20;i   E [l0 j S0]2	
E[l2 j S ]  E [l j S ]2
	
Pr (St j S0) =

E[l20 j S0]  E [l0 j S0]2
	
(d) Average entry size conditional on survival: For  2 f1; 2; 3; 5; 7; 9g, we consider40
fdi = l0;i1
 
;i = 0
  E [l0 j S ] Pr (S j S0)
(vi) Weighting matrix
The weighting matrix is obtained as the inverse of the sample variance-covariance matrix of the moments
38See William Press, Saul Teukolsky, William Vetterling, and Brian Flannery (2007).
39This moment condition can be expressed in terms of the ratio of the time- and time-0 variances.
40This moment condition together with condition (b) can be expressed in terms of the survivor component.
38
in (v),
 1 = (V ar (fi))
 1 , fi = [f
0
ai f
0
bi f
0
ci f
0
di]
0
(vii) Estimation method
We use a simulated annealing method to search for the set of parameter values (; 0 ; 1 ; ;W; P )
that minimizes the method of moments objective function,41
Q =

1
N
XN
i=1
fi
0
 1

1
N
XN
i=1
fi

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